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ABSTRACT
A rudimentary conceptuaiation of the development of ancillary
contract terms would assert competition will result in terms that are
joint-wealth-maximiging for merchants and customers. Building on
developments in modeling fictions in markets, this article presents
simple models of fictions in multi-pediod contracting as to andlary
contract terms. The modeling illustrates that, for plausible parameter
estimates offrictions, combinations of switching costs and investzgation
costs may allow collectively inferior contract terms to persist in consumer
transactions. The results are in harmonj with recent evidence illustrating
the infrequency with which consumers actualy read contract terms.
The modeling identryies circumstances where this opportunistic
behavior-taking advantage offictions to secure collectivey suboptimal
contract terms-is particulary ikey. They include: () contracts of
small dollar amounts, in terms of consideration or marginal cost in
rendering performance; (ii) contracting involving the sequendng of
relationshtp-specic investments during formation; (iii) multi-period
contracting involing increasing switching costs; (iv) rapidly growing
markets; and (v) merchants who befurcate contractual terms among
customers. A number of these factors are common to the provision of
online services.
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This article additionaly samples authority that can be revived by
courts inclined to police opportunistic structuring of the methods of
mutual assent to secure collectiveIy suboptimal contract terms.
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INTRODUCTION
We have all encountered-although perhaps not often actuallyread-ancillary contract terms that appear unlikely to be designed
to be in the aggregate interest of the parties. Illustrative are the facts of a
recent case from Missouri, Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc.,' involving a
successful challenge to a contract provision that sought to require individual
(non-class) arbitration of disputes arising from allegations concerning
deceptively unlawful $0.88 monthly charges to phone customers.
Thirty years ago, some Law and Economics scholars claimed market
competition would eliminate contract terms that did not maximize the
aggregate wealth of the parties: "If one seller offers unattractive terms, a
173 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
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competing seller, wanting sales for himself, will offer more attractive terms.
The process will continue until the terms are optimal." 2 Korobkin describes
this principle as follows: "[S]tandard law-and-economics reasoning suggests
that, if buyers and sellers behave in accordance with assumptions of rational
choice theory, the operation of the market usually will provide drafting parties
with an incentive to include only efficient terms in form contracts."'
Twenty years later, Posner had retreated from full support of this
rudimentary formulation. But the capitulation could not be unequivocal:
But if one seller offers unattractive terms, won't a competing
seller wanting sales for himself, offer more attractive terms, the
processing continuing until the terms are optimal? ...
All this said, the form contracts used in consumer transactions do
tend to be one-sided against the consumer; evidently, competition
cannot be relied upon to yield the optimal form.... Competition
cannot be relied upon to eliminate this asymmetry because the
benefits of the "good" form to the consumer are too slight to
overcome the information costs of making those benefits an effective
selling point....
Yet the one-sided form contract may be optimal after all. A seller
is more likely to be deterred from behaving opportunistically by
considerations of reputation than a consumer is.... Slanting the terms
of the contract in favor of the seller is a way of redressing the
balance. The existence of a one-sided contract does not mean that
the transaction will necessarily be one-sided, but only that the seller
will have discretion with respect to how to treat the customer.4
A glib counter-intuitive analysis may be correct, but one might think the
need to retreat would commend some circumspection. Does one truly
envision businesses cowered into providing unduly favorable contract terms
by unreasonable consumers?
Consider the following term in a credit card contract:
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 102 (3d. ed. 1986).
3 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationaliy, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003). See also, e.g., Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern EconomicAnaysis of
Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of RichardA. Posner, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 193 (1998).
4 RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (7th ed. 2007) (footnote
omitted).
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You may reject the Arbitration of Disputes section but only if we
receive from you a written notice of rejection within 30 days of your
receipt of the Card. You must send the notice of rejection to:
Discover, PO Box 30938, Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0938. Your
rejection notice must include your name, address, phone number,
Account number and personal signature. No one else may sign the
rejection notice for you. Your rejection notice also must not be sent
with any other correspondence. However, if you previously had the
chance to reject an arbitration agreement with us but did not, you
may not reject it now. Rejection of arbitration will not affect your
other rights or responsibilities under this Agreement or your
obligation to arbitrate disputes under any other account as to which
you and we have agreed to arbitrate disputes. If you once sent us a
rejection notice on a different account or card, you must send us a
new rejection notice or else this arbitration agreement will apply to
any disputes with us relating to your other accounts or cards.
Note the anomalous asymmetry: A rejection of arbitration under another
account does not operate to reject arbitration as to this account. However,
any prior failure to opt-out under a prior account prevents opting-out as to
this account. And, failure to reject arbitration under this agreement will
retroactively impose arbitration under preexisting relationships.
Why would a large business propose such a complicated and odd
arrangement? A third-party observer cannot say for sure. But the arrangement
seems at least plausibly designed to take advantage of frictions in contract
formation in order to increase the likelihood that some consumers will be
bound by arbitration. That is, it seems entirely possible that, if frictions can
allow the persistence of suboptimal contract terms, sophisticated parties may
craft their styles of contracting to take advantage of those frictions to their
benefit-to increase the frequency with which they benefit from suboptimal
contract terms that are favorable to them.
The focus of this article is modeling and estimation of the circumstances
in which ancillary contract terms that are not joint-wealth-maximizing can
persist in a competitive market. One assumption in modeling would require
limited rationality. Korobkin goes so far as to state, "The behavioral
Discover Bank Cardholder Agreements, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-
agreements/txt/creditcardagreement_8854.txt (last visited Dec. 1, 2013).
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economic analysis of law has become the economic analysis of law." 6
Modeling behavior assuming assorted cognitive biases is problematic, given,
as Wright and Ginsburg7 note, the unpredictability of combinations of
cognitive biases. In addition, it is preferable to adopt less intrusive
assumptions-i.e., it is preferable to avoid strong assumptions-if weaker
assumptions illuminate relationships of interest.
This article shows more parsimonious assumptions-assumptions less
objectionable than irrationality-can produce steady-state market share for
those offering contract terms that are not joint-wealth-maximizing. In lieu of
reliance on behavioral assumptions, this article builds on the development of
frictions and search theory. Modernly, search theory is prominently examined
in the context of the theory of unemployment by Diamond, Mortensen, and
Pissarides, to which some passing reference has been made in the law review
literature.9
Our objectives in this article are:
* To illustrate that plausible levels of frictions in market
transactions can, in some circumstances, result in perpetuation
of inferior (suboptimal) contract terms-that the frictions can
be sufficient to overcome market forces that might otherwise
be predicted to eliminate the inferior terms;
* To identify some circumstances that may make it more likely
frictions will allow perpetuation of suboptimal terms; and
* To sketch outlines of legal principles that can be used to
mitigate the efficacy of opportunistic structuring of methods of
securing mutual assent designed to capitalize on frictions to
secure preferential, but collectively suboptimal, contract terms.
I. SEARCH COSTS AND ANCILLARY CONTRACT TERMS
The significance of search costs in pricing of contractual relationships
extends back at least to Stigler's 1961 article, where he notes, "Only those
6 Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1653, 1655 (2011).
7 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Orgins, Fatal
Flaws, and ImplicationsforLibery, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1065-66 (2012).
8 Eg, 2010 Laureates in Economic Sciences, THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2010/press.html.
9 E g, Shawn J. Bayern, False Efficieng and Missed Opportnities in Law and Economics, 86 TUL.
L. REV. 135 (2011).
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differences could persist which did not remunerate additional search.... But,
indivisibilities aside, it would normally be unprofitable for buyers or sellers to
eliminate all dispersion."10 Stigler, in examining search for alternatives, further
notes, "The maintenance of appreciable dispersion of prices arises chiefly out
of the fact that knowledge becomes obsolete.""
This insight reveals why a dynamic model is necessary to examine the
relationships. It is the delay in full dissemination of information to market
participants and potential market participants, and their delay in processing
information, that may allow inferior market terms to persist. A dynamic
relationship dependent on factors that vary materially over time cannot be
adequately analyzed by a static model.
Stigler's work examines market variation as to price; his examination
references "[t]he search for knowledge on the quality of goods" as something
which "has been studiously avoided" in his article. 12 One might classify a
contract's terms as an aspect of "quality" that is not separately priced-the
type of matter Stigler's work elides.
Ancillary terms of consumer contracts are qualitatively different in terms
of the extent to which undesirable terms can persist. Basic bargaining typically
does not focus on these terms. Hence, disparities among these terms, and
undesirable terms, can persist longer, by virtue of the increased frictions
associated with altering the terms.
Numerous works reference what might be classified as frictions in
limiting the development of jointly-desirable contract terms. Posner himself
recognized them in the 1986 version of his seminal work Economic Anaysis of
Law:
An objectionable feature of some printed contracts is the use of fine
print or obscure terminology to slip an onerous provision past an
unwary customer; and such conduct is more likely in a monopolized
than in a competitive market.3
A thoughtful analysis was provided in 1990 by Meyerson, who notes:
10 George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69J. POL. EcoN. 213, 219-20 (1961).
11 Id at 220.
12 Id at 224.
13 POSNER, supra note 2, at 103.
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Subordinate terms will not be known because the cost of
acquiring the necessary information exceeds the expected gain to the
consumer from that information ....
The cost to the consumer is made all the more excessive by the
high cost of understanding a term's legal significance. Again, some
sellers try to increase this cost by hiding the term's meaning in
obscure "legalese." 14
This view seems now well-settled. For example, Shavell notes the relevance of
search costs in formulation of contract terms: "An important aspect of
contract formation is the effort individuals devote to it-the time and
resources they expend searching for and investigating contractual
opportunities."15
Posner's discussion continues, purporting to cabin restrictions on this
opportunistic behavior within "species of fraud":
But to thus impose excessive search costs on buyers is, analytically, a
species of fraud (though one rarely actionable) rather than an exercise
in bargaining power. 16
As illustrated in Part V, infra, there are actually many cases that, in a variety of
contexts, deny enforceability to this opportunistic behavior, many referencing
standards that are a far cry from the onerous elements of fraud.
Modern economic work on search costs has identified circumstances
where search costs can result in steady-state persistence of undesirable terms.
Gabaix and Laibson's 2006 work,17 which examines what they describe as
"shrouded attributes,"" provides an illustration. The basic concept involves
service providers who over-charge "myopic" customers for ancillary services,
the cost of which can be avoided by informed customers (by acquiring
14 Michael I. Meyerson, The Effiient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real
World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 597-98 (1990).
15 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 325 (2004). See also,
e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet
To Be Met, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 723, 738-38 (2008) (examining review costs in a larger
examination of market performance).
16 POSNER, supra note 2, at 103.
17 Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. EcON. 505, 507-08 (2006).
18 Id. at 512.
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substitutes). To illustrate, they contemplate excessive costs for hotel parking,
for which alternative transportation could substitute. Over-charging myopic
customers allows for subsidization of informed customers. A competitor
cannot acquire business by properly pricing each component and advertising,
because that will simply drive the informed consumers to the firm that
subsidizes informed consumers by over-charging myopic customers. Gabaix
and Laibson provide more detail for the illustration, which is reproduced in
the margin.19
Certainly some ancillary contract terms may involve an add-on for which
a substitute may be available. Perhaps illustrative would be rental car
provisions imposing damage liability on the customer, where the customer
can arrange some substitute by using a credit card that provides insurance.
However, in many cases a substitute cannot be obtained for inferior contract
terms. For example, if a provision in a consumer contract requires mandatory
non-class arbitration of any dispute, a general way to obtain a substitute for
this particular component is not obvious.
The above discussion notes possibilities in which poor terms will persist.
Acknowledgement of that conclusion is a first step in informing our
understanding of legal doctrine. Yet that observation by itself does not
compel a conclusion that some aspects of contract doctrine should be
19 Id. at 507-08. They write:
To develop intuition for our results, consider a hotel room that costs
Hilton $100 to supply. Suppose that all consumers are initially myopic (i.e., they
do not think about add-ons when they plan a hotel visit). When such a
customer stays at Hilton, she ends up paying $20 to purchase add-ons like
parking, telecommunications, room service, etc. Without loss of generality,
assume that these add-ons cost Hilton nothing to provide. In a competitive
market, Hilton will then advertise "Hilton's rooms cost only $80," neglecting to
mention the costly add-ons that effectively raise its revenue. In competitive
equilibrium, Hilton's costs ($100) equal Hilton's total revenues ($80 + $20).
Now consider another hotel chain, called Transparent, that is picking a
business strategy. Transparent could tell consumers about the shrouded add-
ons that consumers pay for at Hilton. Transparent could advertise, "Watch out
for add-on prices at our competitors. Transparent's add-ons are all free."
Naturally, if Transparent did this, they could not subsidize their room fees with
add-on revenue. An aggressive transparency strategy would be to charge $100
for rooms and nothing for add-ons.
Unfortunately, this efficient pricing scheme might not attract any
customers. Once consumers understand the high mark-up strategy of Hilton,
consumers might prefer to stay at Hilton and simply substitute away from add-
on consumption.
264 9:257 (2015)
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adjusted. If contracting generally produces terms inferior by a penny, who
cares? A next step would require making some assessment of the magnitude
of the impact of these frictions.
Gabaix and Laibson note another factor, market growth, which may play
a role in allowing the mispricing they model to persist.2 0 Consider the
possibility that firms offering latent inferior terms may disproportionately
capture new entrants in a growing market. That could occur where new
entrants are not well-informed about the pertinent terms, where advertising
focuses on more salient features.
This article uses that observation as a basis for benchmarking the
potential significance of frictions. Part II of this article frames the following
inquiry: How much less disproportionate market capture is necessary to
maintain steady-state persistence of inferior terms by virtue of frictions in
search? The modeling addresses both frictions inhibiting dissemination of the
inferiority of certain terms and switching costs increasing over time,
potentially making switching economic.
Difficulty in understanding verbose contract terms needs no further
illustration. Switching costs growing over time may be illustrated by choice of
computer operating system. Over time, as one increasingly uses the selected
system, idiosyncrasies can multiply, increasing switching costs.
Moving beyond mere casual reference to the possible impact of frictions,
Part II of this article develops a simple model of frictions relevant to the
specification of ancillary contract terms. It provides benchmarks illuminating
the extent to which search costs and switching costs may allow steady-state
persistence of non-joint-wealth-maximizing ancillary contract terms. After
developing the model, this article inspects the parameters necessary to create
a steady-state market share that does not vary over time. It would appear the
indicated range of parameters is reasonable-that the combination of search
costs and switching costs can have a significant impact on producing long-
term persistence of inferior terms in a growing market.
Before turning to the modeling, one may note an alternative approach.
One could instead assume limited rationality as the reason for the persistence
of inferior contract terms. Korobkin goes so far as to state, "The behavioral
economic analysis of law ... has become the economic analysis of law." 21
Modeling behavior assuming assorted cognitive biases is problematic, given,
as Wright and Ginsburg note, 22 the unpredictability of combinations of
20 Id. at 522.
21 Korobkin, supra note 6, at 1655.
22 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1065-66.
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cognitive biases. This article shows more parsimonious assumptions-
assumptions less objectionable than irrationality-can produce steady-state
market share for those offering contract terms that are not joint-wealth-
maximizing.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF MARKET GROWTH AND SEARCH
This article proceeds in steps in building a model that reflects market
growth and switching and search costs. In lieu of attempting to model
determination of contract terms in a single transaction, the model assumes a
multi-period market in which those having inferior terms can switch to
vendors offering superior terms, with the market also growing over time, i.e.,
new customers entering each period.
The modeling treats as fixed merchants' choices whether to offer the
inferior terms. A number of circumstances might result in merchants varying
as to the selected terms. To illustrate, consider the market for computing
devices, where some vendors had initially chosen to use a platform subject to
security risks and others had developed more robust platforms. Consider an
ancillary term limiting liability for corruption (a security breach) of the device.
Those who had chosen a robust platform might provide a warranty at no
cost, whereas those who had chosen a poor platform might bury a liability
limit in contract terms.
The first step examines solely market growth. It is perhaps obvious that
one providing inferior terms can maintain a percentage in a growing market
by disproportionately capturing those customers who newly enter the market.
Our more complete model illustrates how switching costs and search costs
can decrease the necessary excess market capture. But we begin with the
model without switching costs, in which all those who become aware of the
undesirability of their terms switch.
The first step in our investigation is to assess whether, under some set of
plausible assumptions, frictions can result in persistence of suboptimal
contract terms. The basic intuition is as follows: In brief, one receiving
proposed contract terms-let's identify this person as a consumer, though
that is not necessarily the case 23-will not necessarily fully investigate their
contents and import before forming a contract and thus will contract without
23 One might be tempted to identify that person as the offeree. Of course, it is certainly
possible for a merchant to proffer a form by which its customers make offers. International
Filter Co. v. Conroe Gin, Ice & Lzght Co., 277 S.W. 631 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925), provides
an illustration familiar to many law students. Hence the less elegant reference.
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knowing the full import of the terms. Subsequent events may reveal the
adverse nature of the terms, causing defection to those offering better terms.
Our modeling hypothesizes two processes that can allow undesirable
terms to persist. That is not to say these are the only possible factors. Rather,
they are the ones that have been selected to be included in the modeling.24
First, the passage of time may result in consumers becoming aware of the
inferiority of terms offered by some merchants. But passage of time also may
increase switching costs, making a change prohibitive. Consider the ancillary
switching costs associated with using alternative word processing software,
after having used one version for some time.
Second, where a customer base has new entrants, disproportionate market
capture of new customers can assist in allowing inferior contract terms to
persist, retaining the same market share, as long as those offering inferior
terms disproportionately capture new customers. For ease of modeling, this
has been framed in terms of a market that is growing, with current customers
not exiting. However, the same kind of results would occur were customers
leaving.
Before turning to the details of the modeling, it is helpful to note that the
question is being framed in a way that understates the impact of frictions. The
ultimately important question-the one relevant to framing the contours of
the law of contracts-is not whether frictions create some merchants
perpetually contracting using inferior terms. Rather, the question pertinent to
informing contract doctrine is whether frictions can cause some relevant
amount of suboptimal contracts to be formed and whether the contours of
contract doctrine can mitigate the negative impact. Some material fraction of
market share perpetually involving inferior terms would be sufficient to
warrant consideration of contract doctrine that might mitigate the impact, but
it surely is not necessary.
Let us first assume there are two groups of vendors, those with "Good
terms" and those with "Bad terms", perhaps illustrated by a consumer
contract requiring mandatory, non-class arbitration of all disputes. There is
some defection from the Bad to the Good in each period, as persons
24 The literature addressing frictions associated with search is voluminous. One relatively
recent survey of some of the literature is Richard Rogerson et al., Search-Theoretic Models of
the Labor Market: A Survey, 43 J. EcON. L. 959 (2005). So, it is not suggested the basics of
the approach to the modeling in this article are unique, or that they are the most refined.
Rather, this paper is using basics from the development of analyzing markets with
frictions to investigate a particular context: ancillary contract terms. See Randall Wright,
Markets with Frictions Jun. 27, 2014), https://class.coursera.org/marketswithfrictions-001,
for an introduction to these principles.
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contracting with the providers having poor terms learn of the problem (in our
illustration, some set of breaches are without a practicable remedy), and
defect to the provider with better terms. There are also new entrants.
The modeling treats as fixed merchants' choices whether to offer the








The existing market has some set of merchants offering Good terms and
some set offering Bad terms. The market grows in a period by a fraction q of
its existing size. To illustrate: Assume a market at the beginning of 100 clients,
with 30 having Bad terms and 70 having Good terms. The market grows by
10% (or 10) in the period. In this case q = 0.10. Some of the new market
entrants (10 in our example) would be captured by those offering Bad terms,
with the remainder captured by merchants offering Good terms. Some
number of those in the market at the beginning and having Bad terms (some
fraction of the 30 in our example) become aware of the inferiority of the
terms they have and defect to merchants offering Good terms. That is
represented by a, for attrition, in the above diagram. It represents the fraction
268 9:257 (2015)
9:257 (2015) Frictions and Inferior Contract Terms 269
of those having Bad terms at the beginning of the period who become aware
of the inferiority of their terms and can switch. We will be investigating what
is necessary to keep a steady-state.
No Attrition. Obviously, if the attrition a equals zero, then steady-state
simply requires that each merchant offering Bad terms must capture a
fraction of the new entrants equal to its fraction of the market at the
beginning of the period. So, continuing our example, a market size of 100, 30
being customers having Bad terms, with 10 new entrants in the period, those
offering Bad need acquire 30/100, 30%, of the new market entrants, or 3.
It will be easiest to define a term that we can call the inflow rate.
That is defined as:
number of new customers merchants number of existing customers
= inflow rate x
offering Bad terms must capture having Bad terms
Where there is not any attrition of existing customers from merchants
offering Bad terms to those offering Good terms, the inflow rate equals the rate
of growth of the market r:
inflow rate = 7
Attrition and No Switching Costs. Let us now define precisely a, the attrition
rate, as being the fraction of those who have Bad terms and who can switch
that do, in fact, switch to a merchant having Good terms in the period. At
the moment, we assume there are not any switching costs. So, in this case, all
who become aware of the inferiority of their terms do switch. That will
increase the inflow rate necessary to keep a steady-state market percentage.
One can identify that by inspection:
inflow rate = 'j + a
Continuing our numerical example, now assuming an attrition rate a equal
to 2%, our above example, the inflow rate necessary to keep a steady-state
market percentage would equal 12%, or 3.6 where the period-beginning
number of customers having Bad terms is 30.
We can see that is obviously correct. With an attrition rate of 2%, 0.6
customers defect to merchants with Good terms. So, to cause the number of
customers with Bad terms to be 33 (increasing by 10% during the period),
merchants with Bad terms must first capture 0.6 who defected and then an
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additional 10% of the 30 customers at the beginning of the period. The sum,
3.6, is 3.6/30, or 12%.
For reasons that will become clear below, it becomes easier to compare
this inflow rate if we state it as:
inflow rate = 1+ (I)
Attrition and Switching Costs. The relationship becomes more complicated
when one also incorporates some fraction of those having Bad terms
becoming unable to switch. For convenience, a flow chart illustrating the
steps is in Appendix I.
The results cannot be derived by inspection. We will leave the derivation
to Appendix II, and at this point simply identify the answer.
To identify the answer, we need first to formulate the restrictions on
switching. Here we will assume that in each period, some fraction of those
who can switch become unable to switch. Let us use the variable i to identify
that fraction (percentage). For example, if = 0.05 (5%), in a market
containing 30 having Bad terms who, at the beginning of the period, could
switch, and an attrition rate a of 0.02, the number switching in that period
would be found by:
The number who could switch in the period = 30 x (1 - 0.05), or
28.5. Thus, the number who do switch in the period = 28.5 x 0.02, or
0.57.
An inflow rate in this case is more complicated to derive, because it
depends on the number of those with Bad terms for whom switching has
become not economic. Let us continue with a market having 100 customers,
30 of whom have Bad terms, with the market growing at 10%. If all with Bad
terms can switch, the needed inflow rate is: 3.57 / 30, or 11.90%.
And, as noted above, as of the end of that period, there are 1.5 customers
who cannot switch. The remaining 31.5 customers can switch. That is the
composition of the customers having Bad terms as of the beginning of the
next period.
Continuing, the additional number that becomes unable to switch in this
second period is: 31.5 x 0.05, or 1.575. Therefore, of the 33 customers with
Bad terms, those who cannot switch number: 1.5 + 1.575, or 3.075
customers. Thus, the number who do switch in the period is: (33 - 3.075) x
0.02, or 0.5985.
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The number of new customers needed to maintain a 30% market share
(increasing the period-beginning market size of 33 by 10%, the growth of the
market each period) equals 3.3 + 0.5985, or 3.8985. That equates to an inflow
rate of 3.8985/ 33, or 11.81%.
That is, the inflow rate decreases in the second period, because the
number of customers having Bad terms, who begin the period being unable
to switch, increases. With a little algebra, shown in Appendix II, one can
determine that when a steady-state is reached, there is the following inflow
rate:
inflow rate = 71 (1 + , (2)
Thus, switching costs decrease the required excess new entrant capture by the
multiple of:
It may be more convenient to depict that factor when restated as:
1-)
1 7
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We can illustrate the impact switching costs have on the excess new entrant
capture required in the following figure:
Figure 1. Extent to which Switching Costs Decrease Required Excess
New Entrant Capture







0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Fraction by which excess inflow needed to offset attrition is decreased by switching costs.
T= 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, and 0.30, in the following diagram (moving to the North-East for
increasing n , so that n = 0.30 is the upper-most plot).
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For example, assume those offering Bad terms comprise 30 in a market
of 100 that grows and that merchants with Bad terms are required to receive
36% of the new clients entering the market in the absence of switching costs.
Illustrative would be market growing at 10% per period, with a 2%
attrition per period from merchants offering Bad terms to those offering
Good terms. So, in the period, 0.6 of the 30 would defect. To maintain a 30%
share in a market growing 10% per period, those offering Bad terms would
need to capture 3 + 0.6 new entrants. (3 + 0.6) / 30 = 12%.
This corresponds to the results from Equation I, for these parameters:
inflow rate = 10% 1 + 00= 12%
For this illustration, a value in the above diagram of 0.63 would
correspond to switching costs reducing from 36% to 33.8% the amount of
new clients entering the market required to be captured by those offering Bad
terms to maintain steady state. That is computed, from Equation II, as: inflow
rate = 10% x (1 + ((0.02/0. 10) x 0.63), or 11.26%. Thus, maintaining steady
state would require capture of 30 x 0.1126, or 3.38 of the 10 new market
entrants (33.8%). (In a steady-state, there is, of course, at the beginning of
each period some number of customers who cannot switch.)
The illustrative computation assumes a two percent attrition per period.
This figure was intended merely as something useful for an illustration.
Recent evidence puts in context a selection of an attrition rate. Bakos et al.
recently report that, in a large sample of web site visitors (48,154),
approximately one in five hundred access a product's end user license
agreement for at least one second, 25 which they suggest is too small to give
rise to an informed-minority equilibrium. 26
III. DELAYED INVESTIGATION OF TERMS
Our discussion in Part II illustrates that switching costs can impede the
extent to which market forces act to eliminate collectively suboptimal
contract terms in ongoing (multi-period) contractual relationships. A question
arises as to why a party entering into such a relationship on terms proffered
25 Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Allention to Standard-Form
Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014).
26 Id. at 27. The modeling in Part II introduces dynamic elements not presented in Bakos et
al.'s brief discussion of the equilibrium.
Virginia Law & Business Review
by the other does not, up front, investigate the terms. One might consider the
following relationship:
period 0 investigation cost <higher return+ higher return2 +(1 + i) (1 + i) 2
Here we are assuming a contractual relationship giving periodic benefits each
period, with a discount rate of i per period, and an investigation cost at the
beginning (period 0). If the higher return from investigation is the same in
each period, either an investigation is made initially or it is never made. The
choice is made initially. That's because if an investigation is not made at
period 0, the decision is the same at period 1. The decision-maker does not
receive the higher return in period 1 but, in period 1, faces the same choice.
The references to the periods are all decreased by 1, and everything is the
same. That's the case for high or low interest rates-either it is profitable to
investigate in the first period or it is never profitable.
That does not really comport with one's intuition. Folks often postpone
decisions. A reason why that might be the case arises from some equivalence
between a discount rate and a probability of a repeated event. Algebraically,
the value of a probability of 90% of receiving $1 in one year from now, where
there is no discount rate, is the same as a 100% probability of receiving $1
one year from now where there is a 10% discount rate. Each is worth (has an
expected present value) of $0.90 today.
The algebraic insight alone is not innovative. However, understanding
that, we can see how an investigation may profitably be postponed. At period
0, the higher return for periods 2 and following are essentially discounted by
both the discount factor (time value of money) plus the probability that the
relationship will not continue.
For example, let's say I am signing-up for some online community that,
for a fee, will connect me with, and allow me to communicate with, and sell
to, potential contracting partners. It's a monthly arrangement. If this is a low-
cost proposition, for the first month, if I expect there is a low probability I
will continue to use the service, I may not pay much attention to the ancillary
terms. However, the next month, the probability that I will continue to use
the service in future months may change. If it increases, the value of my
investigating the contract terms, e.g., to see if there is a way I can opt-out of
mandatory arbitration that I perceive will benefit me in future periods, may
now increase to where it becomes profitable to investigate the terms. It is also
possible that delay will increase the likelihood of, or decrease the cost of,
successful investigation. One can become aware of the adverse consequences
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of particular contract terms through a network of acquaintances. As the
network of users grows, it is more likely another network member will be
informed. Thus, we can envision circumstances where onerous contract terms
are particularly likely to arise in multi-period relationships where the
likelihood of renewal is low.
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES EXACERBATING IMPACT OF FRICTIONS
Our above discussion illustrates there are circumstances in which
frictions can materially influence the contours of agreements and result in the
persistence of inferior contract terms. Intuition on its own may well have led
one to that conclusion. We have above simply provided a more rigorous
development of the principle.
There are many aspects of contract doctrinal development that might
benefit by reference to frictions in contract formation. They are too
numerous for all to be addressed. Instead, we first turn to identifying some
attributes the basic modeling indicates may result in frictions being of
particular significance. This discussion identifies circumstances where the
deleterious impact of frictions is most prominent. We then examine possible
development or refinement of selected contract principles in light of the
insights. The objective is to illustrate the kind of authority on which a court
could draw in adjusting legal doctrine to accommodate the concerns
identified by referencing frictions and, at the same time, maintain fidelity with
extant jurisprudence. In particular, we can identify a variety of authority that
can be revitalized in the process of adjusting illustrative principles of contract
doctrine to accommodate our understanding of the impact of frictions.
We may quickly identify a number of circumstances where the presence
of frictions may be particularly likely to facilitate opportunistic behavior in the
formation of contracts.
Small Contract Value. Frictions more often will be important for contracts
with a relatively small value. The impact of frictions will increase as the
magnitude of the friction increases relative to the value of the contract-
perhaps proportionally, perhaps not. Components of the frictions do not
depend on the size of the value of the contract. For particular contractual
language, the cost to understand it typically would not depend on the dollar
value of the subject matter. Thus, the small magnitude of an individual
transaction particularly presents opportunities for opportunism relying on
frictions. And, of course, the aggregate value realized by opportunistic
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behavior involving small transactions need not be small, if it arises from large
numbers of small transactions.
Sequencing of Relationshib-S edic Investments. Circumstances involving the
sequencing of relationship-specific investments may enhance the ability to use
frictions opportunistically. 27 Fornation of mutual assent can result in
relationship-specific investments before mutual assent is formed. That might
include, for example, the cost of traveling to a vendor to purchase a good or
service. The vendor first visited can offer arrangements that are worse than
those offered by competitors, as long as the difference is less than the cost of
travel to a different vendor.
That might also include the delivery of unordered goods or services.
Putting aside for the moment the special legal treatment of mutual assent
concerning receipt of unordered goods or services, 28 the convenience cost
associated with returning the good or avoiding using the service are like
transaction-specific investments, making other arrangements relatively more
expensive.
Of course, in many cases, it would not be in a vendor's interest to send
an unsolicited good. The cost if assent to a contract is not formed may be
prohibitive. Those problems for the opportunist, however, may be
substantially decreased in the case of certain services, such as computer-
related services, where the marginal cost of providing the service is negligible.
Multi-beriod Contracting. That the relationship involves multi-period
contracting can increase the practicability of opportunistic behavior using
frictions. The possibility the relationship will not be renewed in a subsequent
period may decrease investigation of ancillary contract terms. Particularly in
combination with the possibility of switching costs increasing from period to
period, this circumstance may allow opportunistic behavior to result in
persistence of collectively inferior contract terms.
New Customers; Growing Market. New customers entering a market may
influence the persistence of inferior contract terms. If one becomes aware of
the inferiority of contract terms because one is a market participant, i.e., only
casually, as a customer, new customers entering the marketplace can allow
persistence of inferior contract terms. This can occur where the market size
remains the same, as the infusion of new, uniformed customers dilutes the
27 The significance of relationship-specific investments in contracting is developed in
Williamson's oft-cited work concerning "hostages." See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcON. REV. 519, 522-26 (1983)
(discussing "The Hostage Model").
28 See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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extent to which customers overall are knowledgeable. That a market is
growing rapidly may decrease the percentage excess market capture necessary
for those offering inferior terms to maintain a steady-state market share.
Bifurcation of Contract Terms. An opportunist's ability to discriminate among
customers as to contract terms may facilitate persistence of inferior contract
terms. One factor that may restrain opportunism is loss of business of those
who are informed as to inferiority of possible contract terms. If an
opportunist contracts on the same terms to all, it will discontinue offering
inferior terms where profits lost from defection of knowledgeable customers
exceeds the benefits opportunistically extracted from the uninformed. The
opportunist's solution to this problem may include bifurcation of contract
terms, so that uninformed have inferior terms whereas profits are still realized
from the informed who opt-out of the inferior terms.
V. OVERLOOKED AND SUPPORTING DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
A number of statutory provisions governing contract formation and
performance may be harmonized with our understanding that a class of
parties might otherwise seek to use frictions to obtain collectively suboptimal
contract terms. For example, some statutory provision may require cash
redemption of gift cards having a small value. 29 There is not an apparent
reason why the prohibited conduct would be in the aggregate best interest of
the parties. The statute merely prohibits a reallocation of value so small that it
might not give rise to attempts to address the problem.
Another example: The U.C.C. allows a party to designate a separate
address for communications purporting to offer to settle a dispute (so that
cashing an accompanying check would operate to accept the settlement).3o
This provision addresses the following basic problem: A party currently
owing another money, perhaps a disputed debt, seeks to obtain unknowing
assent to a contract. To do so, it proposes contractual terms when sending a
check, proposing that cashing the check operates as an assent. The concern is
the recipient's cashing of the check will create inadvertent assent.
This circumstance illustrates an attempt to use frictions to obtain terms
superior to those that could be obtained through express bargaining. There is
29 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1749.5(b)(2) (Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 25, also
including Chs. 39 and 41 of 2014 Reg. Sess., Res. Ch. 1 of 2013-2014 2nd Ex. Sess., and
all propositions on the June 3, 2014 ballot). See generaljy Marilao v. McDonald's Corp., No.
09-CV-01014-H (AJB), 2009 WL 3007368 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009) (addressing the
provision).
3o U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(1) (2004).
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a cost associated with having each person who receives checks, purportedly in
payment, confirm the existence of possible contract proposals that will be
accepted on cashing checks. This statutory provision decreases the ability of a
party to use frictions to obtain superior contract terms, by making effective
arrangements that only communication addressed in a particular way needs be
reviewed for contract terms.
This provision more typically benefits merchants in merchant/consumer
contracts, because it would be the merchants who typically would receive
payments. The U.C.C. also has terms that might, in consumer contracting,
more typically benefit consumers, mitigating the consequences of others'
attempts to use frictions to obtain suboptimal contract terms. U.C.C. section
2-316(2)31 limits the effectiveness of certain disclaimers of warranties that are
not conspicuous. This provision restrains some attempts to use the friction
costs associated with reviewing contract terms to purport to offer goods with
warranty terms superior to those actually offered.
Consumer protection provisions can similarly restrain this opportunistic
use of frictions. For example, bait advertising3 2 can create suboptimal
relationships where the inferiority (or expected inferiority, viewed as of the
time the consumer is present at the bait advertiser's establishment) of the bait
advertiser's arrangements equals the convenience cost of going elsewhere.
Another example is provided by assorted provisions allowing persons
receiving unordered merchandise to keep it without paying. 3 This kind of
arrangement is less likely to be undertaken opportunistically in the context of
parties having an ongoing relationship for the resale of the goods.
Opportunism may poison an ongoing relationship. Authority indicates the
federal prohibition does not apply to transactions between parties with an
ongoing resale relationship.3 4 So, the contours of this federal prohibition
conform to the concerns of opportunism: The federal prohibition does not
apply in contexts where the acts are less likely to be part of an opportunistic
scheme.
A third example is provided by prohibitions on, and the regulation of, the
use of offers formulated as simulated checks.35
31 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2012).
32 See 16 C.F.R. § 238.3 (Westlaw through June 19, 2014) for Federal prohibitions on bait
advertising.
3 See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
3s CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17539.1 (a) (Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch.
25, also including Chs. 39 and 41 of 2014 Reg. Sess., Res. Ch. 1 of 2013-2014 2nd Ex.
Sess., and all propositions on the June 3, 2014 ballot) (restricting the use of simulated
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Only particular circumstances are addressed by these statutory provisions
that restrain a party's taking advantage of frictions in contract formation, for
purposes of securing beneficial, but collectively suboptimal, contract terms.
The question arises whether extant common law doctrine constrains courts
addressing circumstances outside the scope of statutory provisions, impeding
doctrinal development that can restrain a party's securing beneficial terms that
are collectively suboptimal.
An unrefined view of contract doctrine would suggest courts have limited
tools to address these circumstances, other than infrequently-used principles
of unconscionability. The primitive view is there is a duty to read an offer, so
that failure to inform oneself of the pertinent offered contract terms
immunizes them from challenge,36 in the absence of extraordinarily
unfavorable terms that trench on public policy concerns, are proffered by
fiduciaries, are unconscionable or the like. This conceptualization seems a
consistent part of the general objective approach to formation of mutual
assent.
checks in advertising); id. § 22433 (prohibiting certain uses of simulated checks); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 36a-497(2) (Westlaw through enactments approved by the Governor on or
before June 6, 2014 and effective on or before July 1, 2014) (prohibiting certain uses of
simulated checks by mortgage lenders or brokers); id. § 42-299 (prohibiting use of
simulated checks in connection with sweepstakes unless the simulated check is clearly
annotated); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1723(C)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2013
Regular Session) (requiring conspicuous disclosure on simulated checks used in the
solicitation of sale or lease of goods or services); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-0:6 (West,
Westlaw through Chapter 81 of the 2014 Reg. Sess., not including changes and
corrections made by the State of New Hampshire, Office of Legislative Services)
(requiring the same in a consumer transaction); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW 5 396-aa.2
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 30, 50 to 60) (prohibiting distribution
of simulated check not conspicuously containing a specified disclaimer); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-35 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2014-2 of the 2014 Regular Session) (prohibiting
issuance of writings that simulate negotiable instruments); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 42-
61.1-5(1) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 534 of the January 2013 session) (requiring
conspicuous disclaimer in use of simulated check in a consumer transaction); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-15-60(1) (Westlaw through end of 2013 Reg. Sess.) (same); VA. CODE ANN. 5
59.1-419 (West, Westlaw through End of the 2013 Reg. Sess. and the End of 2013 Sp. S. I
and includes 2014 Reg. Sess. cc. 1, 2, 8, 23, 29, 47 and 59) (requiring conspicuous
disclaimer in use of simulated check in a consumer transaction); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.170.050 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legislation effective on June 12, 2014, the
General Effective Date for the 2014 Regular Session, and 2014 Legislation effective July
1, 2014) (requiring specified disclosure on simulated check); W. VA. CODE ANN. 5 46A-
6D-6 (West, Westlaw through laws of the 2014 Regular and First Ex. Sess. with effective
dates through June 2, 2014) (requiring conspicuous disclaimer in use of simulated check in
a consumer transaction).
36 See infra note 43.
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There are, of course, some obvious detours from this objective approach.
As is familiar to students of contract doctrine, one anomalous deviation from
that objective approach is the treatment of ambiguity, where one party is
aware of the ambiguity and the other is not. The traditional doctrinal answer,
reflected in the Restatement, is a party cannot take advantage of the other's
ignorance of ambiguity, requiring an ambiguous provision be construed
against the sole party aware of the ambiguity.3 7 Subjectivity is also referenced
in the doctrine governing mistake, where a party's awareness of the other's
mistake can be a factor relevant to the availability of the defense." Were the
common law not this way, the circumstance could facilitate a better-informed
party's reliance on frictions-costs that would be incurred by the other in
informing itself-to secure terms beneficial to it but collectively suboptimal.
To the uninitiated, those approaches, however, seem like outliers in the
common law, with the harsh approach reflected in a duty to read reigning
elsewhere. A more careful examination of precedent, however, reveals a
remarkable lack of uniformity in this regard. As the common law was
developing, quite a bit of authority short of the bludgeon of unconscionability
restrains techniques relying on frictions to secure beneficial contract terms.
To illustrate the approach a court might take in seeking to incorporate the
understanding of frictions in developing contract doctrine, this article focuses
on the following issues:
* The extent to which extrinsic language can be effectively
incorporated by reference into a contract;
* The extent to which silence operates as an assent; and
* The extent to which tickets, and other language not exclusively
designed to communicate contract terms, can set contract terms.
Each presents assorted opportunities for one party (or one class of parties) to
frame the mutual assent process so that frictions may facilitate persistence of
collectively inferior contract terms that benefit that party.
37 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2) (1981).
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153(b) (1981). See generaljy Randolph
Constr. Co. v. Kings East Corp., 334 A.2d 464, 467 (Conn. 1973) (citing Lovell v. City of
Altus, 246 P. 468 (Okla. 1925), involving mistake in bid preparation arising from absence
of some sheets of the pertinent plans).
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A. Incorporation by Reference
It is possible for an offer to incorporate by reference extrinsic language.
It could be language from something designed to be part of a contract. But it
need not be. An offer can incorporate by reference statutory language, 9
language from an administrative rule4 0 or something else.41 The effect of
incorporation by reference is to treat the extrinsic language as if it were
reproduced in the incorporating document.42
The relevance of incorporation by reference to our purposes of
investigating frictions in contract formation is that this style of contracting
can increase an offeree's cost of apprising itself of the import of proposed
terms. That can happen in a few ways. There may be inconvenience cost in
obtaining the document. In addition, the ability to incorporate extrinsic
writings facilitates the provision of more detailed contractual terms-they
need not be printed in something that has to be delivered to the other party.
More detailed contractual terms may be more expensive to review. So, the
ability to incorporate by reference an extrinsic writing may increase the costs
of an offeree's review of the pertinent terms.
To illustrate, a party offering inferior services might seek to realize pricing
comparable to that realized by those offering superior services by decreasing
remedial rights available to its customers through obscure latent contract
provisions incorporated by reference. Obscurity of the terms may increase
frictions and increase market share relative to that which would be realized
were customers fully informed.
A facile analysis of the legal issues presented by this opportunistic use of
incorporation by reference might be:
An offer may properly incorporate by reference adequately identified
extrinsic terms. An offeree who purports to accept has a duty to read
proposed contract terms. The accepting offeree therefore will be
bound by those terms the offer purports to incorporate. 43
9 Longfellow v. Sayler, 737 N.W.2d 148, 154 (Iowa 2007).
40 Id.
41 Eg, Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-60 (Utah 1996) (addressing
incorporation of industry standards promulgated by the National Bureau of Standards).
42 Eg, King v. Larsen Realty, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 226, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Schenkel &
Shultz, Inc. v. Hermon F. Fox & Assocs., P.C., 658 S.E.2d 918, 921-22 (N.C. 2008).
43 Eg, Dow Corning Corp. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 604, 611 (E.D.
Mich. 2011) ("A party cannot later plead ignorance as an excuse if the contract is clear on
its face that such terms were intended to be incorporated and failure to obtain an
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However, a court thoughtfully considering the circumstances has a variety
of techniques at its disposal that, consistent with certain prior authority, can
reach a different result.
Some old authority directly identifies this possibility and rejects
application of ordinary principles that would effectively incorporate extrinsic
language by reference where the technique would inject terms that are not
usual or reasonable, "imperfectly described . . . [that] did not give fair
notice," 44 or where the technique is used in an "apparent attempt to
explanation of a contract demonstrates negligence.';; Gray & Co. Realtors, Inc. v. Atlantic
Housing Found., Inc., 228 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App. 2007) (stating, after referencing an
obligation to read documents one signs, that "This obligation would logically and
necessarily include knowing the terms of any separate sales contract explicitly referenced
in a representation agreement.").
Even as to this bromide, some authority indicates that this kind of determination is
for a jury. A Missouri opinion says the following as to a claim that an initial offeror had
accepted a counter-offer made by penning-in a proviso on a form of contract and
returning it to the original offeror:
In order to bind the defendant in this new proposal, it devolved on the plaintiff
to introduce some evidence tending to prove that the defendant assented to the
new proposition. The court in its instructions assumed that there was such
evidence, and this is the real question. The rule is that there is no contract until
both parties assent to the same thing in the same sense. A proposition becomes
a contract only when the party receiving it communicates, either actually or
constructively, his acceptance to the other contracting party. Express notice of
acceptance is dispensed with, when apparently not contemplated; but in such a
case the acceptance must be clearly manifested by some other act. The burden
of showing this is on the party seeking to obtain the benefits of the contract. In
the case before us we think that there was sufficient evidence of acceptance by
the defendant to carry the question to the jury. The defendant admitted that he
received the instrument sent to him through the mails. From this admission the
jury would be authorized to draw the inference that he read it. Whether the
defendant's evidence to the contrary was sufficient to rebut such an inference
was for the jury. This rule of evidence is frequently applied in actions on
accounts stated, where it appears that a party has received a statement of his
account through the mail, and has made no objection to it. If the defendant did
assent to the contract as modified, which necessarily implies knowledge of the
change, there was no necessity of direct or actual notice of acceptance, because
nothing else was required to be done by the plaintiff to make the contract
complete. The defendant's subsequent conduct in treating the plaintiff as a
subcontractor was evidence of acceptance on his part. We must, therefore,
conclude that the court committed no error in submitting this issue to the jury.
Robertson v. Tapley, 48 Mo. App. 239, 242-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1892) (citations omitted).
44 Sohns v. Beavis, 93 N.E. 935, 937 (N.Y. 1911) (addressing restrictive covenants' binding
auctioned realty).
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overreach or deceive." 45 Other authority implicitly rejects incorporation by
reference involving "unfair dealing." 46 Although courts typically reject a
45 Annotation, Effect of Par)y's Ignorance of Contents of Extraneous Paper upon Attempt to Incorporate
It into Contract by Reference, 70 L.R.A. 106, 108-09 (1906) ("As above intimated in several
decisions, the rule shown, while apparendy unbending in the absence of fraud or any
element of that nature, becomes nullified by any apparent attempt to overreach or deceive
by means of embodying the conditions of the contract in an extraneous document.").
Fiedman v. Handelman, 90 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1949), illustrates reasonableness limits on
the incorporation by reference of extrinsic language, if giving effect to the incorporation
would unreasonably alter the express terms of the incorporating document. A buyer of
real estate assigned rights under the contract to a third party. The assigned contract stated
the buyer was to take tide "[s]ubject to covenants, restrictions and easements of record."
Id. at 33-34. The assignment stated the assigned contract was "made a part" of, i.e.,
incorporated by reference into, the contract of assignment. Id at 33. The contract of
assignment expressly conditioned the assignee's obligation to perform on receipt of
insurance of good and marketable tide. Id at 32. The required insurance could not be
obtained by virtue of restrictions of record. The court held that the incorporated
provision did not prevent the assignee's exercise of the condition in the incorporating
document: "We may not by construction excise from the February agreement paragraph
2c, which the parties intended should define their rights and obligations; nor may we
insert in that paragraph following the phrase 'good and marketable tide' the words
'Subject to the covenants, easements and restrictions of record.' In other words we may
not 'make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing."' Id at
34 (quoting Heller v. Pope, 164 N.E. 881, 882 (N.Y. 1928)).
46 E.g., Batter Bldg. Materials Co. v. Kirschner, 110 A.2d 464, 468 (Conn. 1954) ("Nor is a
party allowed, in the absence of accident, fraud, mistake or unfair dealing, to escape his
contractual obligations by saying, as each of the plaintiffs does here, that he did not read
what was expressly incorporated as specific provisions of the contract into which he
entered.").
Williston provides an extensive extract from an English case, Phoenix Insurance Co. of
Hartford v. De Monchj, [1929] 141 L.T. 439, 442 (H.L.), affirming a determination that a
provision in a policy specifying the time by which an action must be brought, not
referenced in the certificate, is not incorporated into the certificate and, therefore, not
binding. 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 628, at 911-13 (3d ed. 1961). The opinions in Phoenix reference the
infeasibility of obtaining access to the pertinent provision and the one-sided nature of the
purportedly incorporated terms as bases for not giving effect to the purported
incorporation. Phoenix, [1929] 141 L.T. at 439 ("It follows, I think, that all clauses of the
policy which are essential to the contract of marine insurance must be read into the
certificate, but beyond that there is no necessity to go. The condition in question is a
collateral stipulation imposing a condition precedent. It has nothing to do with insurance
particularly, but might be applied to any contract. Common sense and fairness revolt
against the idea of this being enforced against the holder or indorsee of the certificate.
Neither the holder, as here, nor a possible indorsee could ever have seen the policy. There
is not even expressed in the certificate a right to ask for exhibition of the policy. Against
them it may be fair to assume ordinary insurance clauses, but not to assume a collateral
agreement of this sort.'; (Viscount Dunedin); id ("If ... a buyer were told [of the terms], I
am sure that he would have none of it, and under these circumstances I think the courts
Virginia Law & Business Review
requirement of rote recitation of particular words to effect incorporation-
what is required is a manifestation of an intent to be bound by the extrinsic
writing'-the requirement that incorporation be effectively communicated
can provide some leeway to-a "covert tool," in Llewellyn's language 48 for-
a court inclined not to incorporate extrinsic language by reference. 49 And one
case references the ease with which allegedly incorporated language could
have been included in concluding extrinsic language is not effectively
incorporated.50
There are other context-specific principles that can restrain this
opportunistic approach to setting of contract terms: Some authority finds
ineffective attempted incorporation by reference unless the complaining party
has knowledge of the pertinent terms. Other authority prevents incorporation
of terms not in existence at the time of the original assent, which might be
described as "delinquent terms"-the postponement of creation of terms also
might be used strategically to disadvantage a party. We now turn to selections
from that authority.
below rightly refused to countenance for the insurers' sole benefit an incorporation so
ambiguous and so one-sided.") (Viscount Sumner).
47 Eg, Northrop Grumman Info. Tech., Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) ("[A] requirement that contract language be explicit or otherwise clear and
precise does not amount to a rule that contracting parties must use a rote phrase or a
formalistic template to effect an incorporation by reference."); PartyLite Gifts, Inc. v.
MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2012); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004).
48 K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
49 See, e.g, Bob Montgomery Chevrolet, Inc. v. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 193 (Tex.
App. 2013). The opinion holds that the lower court erred by incorporating extrinsic terms:
We conclude the referring language in this case, "Additional benefits,
qualifications and details of the PDR LINx Service Program are available for
your review at our website:
http://www.1inxmanager.com/pdf/CRCTermsConditions.pdf," does not
indicate the parties intended to incorporate the internet document. Instead, the
language indicates the internet document contained informative but
noncontractual material about the PDR LINx Service Program.
Id. It is not clear what a "qualification" of the program would be, if not intended to alter
the contractual relationship.
so Peterson v. Residential Alternatives of Ill., Inc., 932 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
(quoting Braeside Realty Trust v. Cimino, 133 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985))
("The rules of contract construction include a strong presumption against adding
conditions or provisions that could have been easily included by the parties as terms of
the contract, but were not.").
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Knowlede. It is sometimes said that contract terms are not incorporated by
reference unless the offeree "had knowledge of and assented to the
incorporated terms."" The principle is sometimes linked to the requirement
that incorporated language is required to be identified adequately in the
incorporating document.5 2
Although this particular style for phrasing of the principles is typically
expressed in opinions construing California law," it nevertheless appears to
tEg, PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1200-01 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Lamb v.
Emhart Corp., 47 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the language "arbitration
shall be governed by the rules of the organization convening the panel" was insufficient to
incorporate by reference the limitations provision in the code governing the arbitral
forum, the NASD). See also Taubman Cherry Creek Shopping Ctr., LLC v. Neiman-
Marcus Grp., Inc., 251 P.3d 1091, 1095 (Colo. App. 2010) (quoting 11 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 30.25, at 234
(4th ed. 1999)) ("[F]or an incorporation by reference to be effective, 'it must be clear that
the parties to the agreement had knowledge of and assented to the incorporated terms."');
Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 983 A.2d 604, 618-19 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (holding statement in attorney retainer agreement that client
would be bound "by our standard billing practices and firm policies" was ineffective to
incorporate the policies by reference, both because they were not adequately identified
and because "there [was] no indication that the terms of the proposed incorporated
document were known or assented to by defendants';; Kuempel Co. v. Superior Sprinkler
Co., No. C-840583, 1986 WL 6202, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 4, 1986) (holding
contractual reference in agreement formed October 1976 to the "latest edition" of form
documents referred not to 1976 version published shortly before but to 1970 version,
citing the requirement that incorporated document must be "known or easily available to
the contracting parties").
52 Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28-29 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976) (stating that "something more than a casual reference by incorporation is
called for" in declining to enforce arbitration provisions under exchange rules putatively
incorporated, referring to the ability to "change the ground-rules on a game-by-game
basis," and noting that "a mere inspection of this 'agreement' indicates that it probably
was not meant to be read").
s3 E.g, Scott's Valley Fruit Exch. v. Growers Refrigeration Co., 184 P.2d 183, 189 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1947) (providing language oft-referenced in California: "For the terms of another
document to be incorporated into the document executed by the parties the reference
must be clear and unequivocal, the reference must be called to the attention of the other
party and he must consent thereto, and the terms of the incorporated document must be
known or easily available to the contracting parties."), disapproved on other grounds b
Hischemoeller v. Nat'l Ice & Cold Storage Co. of Cal., 294 P.2d 433, 439 (Cal. 1956). See
also, e.g, Cariaga v. Local No. 1184 Laborers Intern. Union of N. Am., 154 F.3d 1072,
1074 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Slaught v. Bencomo Roofing Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 618, 621
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994)) (stating that the "incorporated document must be known or easily
available to the contracting parties"); Kleveland v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d
314, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("Incorporation by reference requires that (1) the reference
to another document was clear and unequivocal; (2) the reference was called to the
attention of the other party, who consented to that term; and (3) the terms of the
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have a broader application. For example, authority quotes Corpus Juris
Secundum to the following effect: "For the terms of another document to be
incorporated into the document executed by the parties, the reference must
be clear and unequivocal, and must be called to the attention of the other
party, he must consent thereto, and the terms of the incorporated document
must be known or easily available to the contracting parties; each case must
turn on its own facts."5 4 A number of cases from other jurisdictions also
reference the principle.55
Riordan v. Doy 5 6 provides an illustration from over 100 years ago. The
opinion is written cryptically. In addition, reflecting an older style, some of
the pertinent factual background appears only in headnote text. The case
appears to involve the issue of whether contracts formed using a particular
incorporated documents were known or easily available to the contracting parties.");
Wolschlager v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 179, 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
54 Tidewater Skanska, Inc. v. Plateau Elec. Constructors, Inc., No. Civ. A. 2:05CV395, 2006
WL 1805857, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 28, 2006) (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts 5 299, at 136-37
(1963)).
ss E.g., Dakota Foundry, Inc. v. Tromley Indus. Holdings, Inc., 737 F.3d 492, 495-96 (8th
Cir. 2013) (applying South Dakota law); Rinard v. Eastern Co., 978 F.2d 265, 269 (6th Cir.
1992) (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 299, at 136 (1963)); Alloys Intern., Inc. v. Aeronca,
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-293, 2012 WL 3600090, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2012) (finding
purported incorporation of Defense Acquisition Regulations "in effect on the date
hereof' insufficient to incorporate language in regulations that had "ceased to exist,"
referencing the "easily available" requirement); Shanks v. Meritage Homes of Arizona,
Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 09-0137, 2010 WL 286791, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010)
(quoting pertinent language holding that the document's addressing the statutory
requirement to advise a buyer of certain rights was incorporated by reference); Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. El Dorado Chem. Co., 283 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Ark. 2008) (quoting 17A C.J.S.
Contracts § 316 (1999)); Taubman Cherry Creek Shopping Ctr., LLC v. Neiman-Marcus
Grp., Inc., 251 P.3d 1091, 1095 (Colo. App. 2010) (examining whether reference to
arbitration rules incorporated subsequently amended rule provisions); Safeway, Inc. v.
Nordic PCL Const., Inc., 312 P.3d 1224, 1234 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting 17A C.J.S.
Contracts § 402 (2011)); Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc., 264 P.3d 400,
416 (Idaho 2011) ("A signed agreement may incorporate by reference to another
agreement, which is not signed by the parties, if the terms to be incorporated are
adequately identified and readily available for inspection by the parties."); Peterson &
Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 217 P.3d 716, 721 (Utah 2009) (quoting part of the
phrasing); Mattingly v. Palmer Ridge Homes LLC, 238 P.3d 505, 512 (Wash. Ct. App.
2010) (quoting Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, 97 P.3d 11, 16 (Wash. 2004)) (stating, in
finding certain terms unconscionable, that "[a]lthough 'parties have a duty to read the
contracts they sign,' documents incorporated by reference usually must be reasonably
available, at the least, so that the essentials of a contract can be discerned by the signer.");
State ex rel. U-Haul Co. of W. Va. v. Zakaib, 752 S.E.2d 586, 595-96 (W. Va. 2013).
56 27 S.E. 939 (S.C. 1897).
286 9:257 (2015)
9:257 (2015) Frictions and Inferior Contract Terms 287
code effectively incorporated standard terms, exchange rules, the code book
indicates will be incorporated by reference. The court holds not.
The case involves futures contracts for cotton. There were statutory
provisions at the time invalidating as unlawful wagering contracts agreements
for future transactions in commodities that were not to be settled in kind. 7
Extrinsic language allegedly incorporated by reference was proffered as
relevant to whether the contracts were of the type prohibited.
The contracts were evidently communicated using a telegraph code, the
book for which contemplated transactions communicated using the code
would be subject to rules of a particular exchange. A headnote states the
"telegraphic cipher code contains a note, 'it is distinctly understood that all
orders sent by this table are to be subject in all respects to the rules of the
Cotton Exchange."' The court holds the trial court correctly excluded the
exchange rules from introduction into evidence, i.e., the use of the code did
not incorporate the provisions of the exchange's rules. The basis of the
holding is reference to the extrinsic provisions was not sufficiently patent:
The fact that some reference was made to them in Shepperson's
Telegraphic Cipher Code, which seems to have been furnished to the
defendant, cannot affect the question, for such reference did not
disclose the scope or purport of the rules and by-laws of the New
York Cotton Exchange. If the parties dealing with the defendant
desired or expected the defendant to be governed by such rules and
by-laws, it was their duty to have brought their provisions to his
attention, which does not appear to have been done.59
Delinquent Terms. Authority often states an extrinsic document is not
effectively incorporated unless it is "adequately identified" 60-sometimes
s7 Id. at 940.
ss Id. at 939 (headnote). Bibb . Allen, 149 U.S. 481 (1893), a case involving a transcription
error in use of the code, describes the code as to a similar effect, suggesting the headnote
in Riordan can be taken as accurate.
59 Rrdan, 27 S.E. at 943.
60 E.g., City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 299 P.3d 232, 242 (Idaho 2013). Cf Northrop
Grumman Info. Tech., Inc. v. United States, 535 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[T]he
language used in a contract to incorporate extrinsic material by reference must explicitly,
or at least precisely, identify the written material being incorporated and must clearly
communicate that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced material
into the contract (rather than merely to acknowledge that the referenced material is
relevant to the contract, e.g., as background law or negotiating history).").
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requiring the extrinsic language be "identified beyond all reasonable doubt." 61
This principle can be a basis under which terms of a document not yet in
existence can be held not to be incorporated by reference. 62 The failure to
identify the putatively incorporated document in a way that facilitates locating
it has been found relevant to determining the attempted incorporation
ineffective.63
A merchant seeking to obtain contractual consumer terms that could not
be bargained-for expressly might proffer unreasonable terms incorporated by
reference from some poorly identified extrinsic document or some document
to be generated later. This would be with a view to increasing the consumer's
cost of identifying the terms, i.e., increasing the associated friction. This
authority, which limits the efficacy of those acts that may increase frictions,
supports the notion that contracting with documentation formulated in a way
61 PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1201 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Chiacchia v. Nat'l
Westminster Bank USA, 507 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)).
62 Randolph Const. Co. v. Kings East Corp., 334 A.2d 464, 467 (Conn. 1973) ("It may be
argued that a contract which incorporates nonexisting documents is valid on the
condition that the documents be in existence before either party attempts to enforce
performance; 4 Williston, Contracts (3d Ed.) § 581; and in some instances, the law will
uphold performance requirements beyond those apparent in the plans or specifications of
a building contract. Where the specifications are altered, however, without the knowledge
or understanding of the party to be bound, or when the documents on which the
knowledge of one party is based are incomplete, so that the parties do not share a
mutuality of assent, the contract as written will be held invalid." (citation omitted)).
63 Cariaga v. Local No. 1184 Laborers Intern. Union of N. Am., 154 F.3d 1072, 1073-75
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding no incorporation made by reference in subcontract to
"comply[ing] with and be[ing] bound by . . . terms and conditions" of prime's "labor
agreements"; subcontractor not required to arbitrate labor dispute because the reference
"[was] amorphous and d[id] not 'guide the reader' to the incorporated document");
Interstate Striping, Inc. v. Laborers Intern. Union of N. Am., No. 97-55915, 1998 WL
746131, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1998) (document not "clearly and unequivocally
incorporate[d] by reference"); Chan v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 223 Cal. Rptr. 838,
845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Hope v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 853 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981)) ("The rules of an organization may be found in a plethora of sources,
including its constitution, statutes, bylaws, manuals, and memoranda. The constitution
alone of the NYSE 'is a formidable document of some 70 pages.' One who reads
paragraph 2C would not even know which body of rules to consult to find the elusive
arbitration language."). Cf Froelich v. Heritage Escrow Co., No. B149413, 2001 WL
1386194, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2001) (holding contract provisions purporting to
incorporate terms of standard form ineffective where agreement provided a party only
governed with provisions complying with "established escrow standards and practices in
Southern California"). See generaly Ward v. TheLadders.Com, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 1605
(JGK), 2014 WL 945011, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2014) (holding statement in website
terms of use that site "may contain other terms and conditions" insufficient to
incorporate into contractual terms certain affirmations on web site).
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that increases frictions, such as by needlessly increasing the cost of locating
the incorporated language, may be relevant in determining the attempted
incorporation ineffective.
The facial similarity between this authority and the modern rolling contracts
theory is deceptive. The rolling contracts theory refers to a situation under
which an understanding is formed through a vignette involving one party's
delayed delivery of additional terms, after which delivery the recipient would
have some time to reject and return, postponing contract formation.6 4 The
rolling contracts approach to contract formation allows a party to take
advantage of frictions to secure better terms. The recipient of the terms will
not review them unless the expected benefit (from identifying any inferiority
of the terms) exceeds the convenience cost of review plus identification of a
substitute and the cost to return. The result is that if the convenience costs
exceed the anticipated benefits from review, the suboptimal terms control.
On the other hand, the result of the various authority discussed above is a
contract is formed with the proffered, onerous terms eliminated. The impact
is the opposite of that of the rolling contracts approach to contract
formation.
The primary point being made here is there is a collection of authority
supporting the notion that there is a reasonableness limit on incorporation
into a contract of extrinsic terms. That is not to say the authority is universal,
or even the talismanic "majority" approach. Nevertheless, there is a material
amount of authority to that effect. It is sufficient to provide a basis on which
a court can, in a fashion plausibly consistent with other long-standing
authority, incorporate reasonableness limits on the effectiveness of
incorporation of extrinsic terms.
Over time, technology has facilitated modes of contracting that were
more difficult or even impossible previously. A mere computer click can
purport to operate to accept terms located remotely of limitless length.
The point of following precedent is to provide consistent principles
governing disputes. As the common law was developing, centuries ago, the
technology then-available was at times used in attempts to secure assent to
latent terms. Problems were occasionally recognized judicially, and a number
of courts articulated principles restraining the problematic conduct.
Technology has made that undesirable conduct more practicable. It is not
inconsistent with the notion of precedent to rely increasingly on principles
64 Authority discussing the controversial analysis is voluminous. See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr.,
The Dubious Status ofthe Rolling Contract Formation Theory, 50 DuQ. L. REv. 35 (2012), for an
eminent commentator's recent contribution to that literature.
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that were formerly referenced less frequently, when technological or other
societal developments have made the problematic conduct more common.
Regardless of whether authority such as Riordan v. Doty was formerly in vogue,
it is consistent with the principles of precedent to turn to that authority as the
misconduct that authority operates to restrain becomes more frequent.
One supposes contemporary courts seeking to revive the approach of
Riordan and the other authority discussed above could do so in two ways.
They could reinvigorate and directly rely on that authority, as a manner for
the court exclude from the bargain assorted proffered terms attempted to be
incorporated. On the other hand, a more limited step would be simply to
make it a question for the fact-finder whether the extrinsic terms were part of
the bargain. The current edition of Williston asserts, "[W]hether material has
been incorporated presents a question of law." 65 However, the general trend
is to return to the jury these kinds of questions that courts formerly, reflecting
distrust of juries, kept for themselves.66 So, it would be consistent with the
general trend in contract law also to allocate this determination to a fact-
finder.
B. Silence as Acceptance
The law governing whether silence can operate as an acceptance provides
a second circumstance where the broad-brushstroke statement of
contemporary principles can easily elide pertinent authority that would
support decisions inhibiting opportunistic use of frictions to secure beneficial
contract terms. Consider the delivery of unsolicited goods. Absent the
intervention of judicial principles, a vendor might seek to obtain sales that
otherwise would not be made by delivering unsolicited goods and then billing
for them. A recipient's misapprehension of the law governing assent-a
matter that may be costly to investigate-could produce some sales, with
grudging assent that otherwise would not be obtained.
Absent judicial intervention, this approach to securing beneficial, but
collectively suboptimal, contractual terms might show particular promise
for-and seem particularly successful in-consumer contracts where
marginal cost to fulfilling any particular contract is low. For other contracts, a
65 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:25 (4th ed.
1999) available at Westlaw WILLSTN-CN 30:25.
66 See generall 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.18 Joseph M.
Perillo & Peter Linzer eds., rev. ed. 1993) (discussing the historical distrust of juries, and
the modern developments).
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merchant might increasingly hesitate to render unsolicited valuable items
without a preexisting contract, fearing that a contract would not be formed.
But if the performance costs little or nothing, the strategy might be more
remunerative. Unfortunately, existing doctrine, at least in its rudimentary
form, seems not well-suited to restraining this type of opportunistic strategy
in circumstances where it has increased promise-the opportunistic delivery
of services or intangibles.
The delivery of unordered merchandise, other than free samples and
merchandise mailed by a charity, is categorized by federal statute as an unfair
trade practice, which the recipient may treat as a gift.6 7 Some judicial
interpretations of this brief statutory language are consistent with recognizing
the importance of frictions. Thus, Blakemore v. Superior Court holds the statute
does not regulate mailing of unordered merchandise "to independent jobbers
or wholesalers or, as in this case, where a contractual relationship exists
between the parties relating to the sale of the merchandise."68 The outcome is
not based on language in the statute expressly exempting those sales. Rather,
it follows from the perceived purpose of the statute, as reflected in legislative
history. 9 On the other hand, a variety of authority declines to extend these
protections to transactions not involving physical merchandise, such as a
check sent as part of an unsolicited offer to extend credit70 and a membership
kit for a rewards or discount program, 71 where the court states, "[he
Unordered Merchandise Statute governs only merchandise, and not
everything that can be mailed falls within this category. In Kypperman,
intangibles evidenced by written materials-there, an insurance policy or,
arguably, an offer to sell insurance-were not found to be 'merchandise' as
contemplated in the Statute."7 2
Consumer transactions increasingly involve intangibles (software or other
services), which may not be embodied in a physical form. In such a case-
67 39 U.S.C.A. § 3009 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-145 (excluding P.L. 113-121, 113-
128, and 113-143)).
68 Blakemore v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
69 Id. at 888.
7o Kashelkar v. Rubin & Rothman, 97 F. Supp. 2d 383, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
71 Sanford v. Memberworks, Inc., No. 02CV0601-LAB (JFS), 2008 WL 4482159, at *11-13
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008). See also Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 559-60
(9th Cir. 2010) (stating memberships in discount programs are not merchandise;
referencing prior authority as indicating merchandise is generally tangible).
72 Sanford, 2008 WL 4482159, at *11 (citing Kipperman v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 554 F.2d 377,
380-81 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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offers having an intangible subject matter 3-the statute, as interpreted,
would leave to the common law determination of whether the recipient's
subsequent actions operated as an assent to proposed contract terms. As the
Corbin treatise notes, however, the statutory treatment is inconsistent with
the common law approach, under which use of the unordered merchandise
would operate as an acceptance of the proposed contract terms.74 The treatise
notes this treatment is an alternative to classifying the offeree as one who has
tortiously converted the property.75 The treatise describes the common law
approach as "particularly outrageous[] where the goods are sent as a deliberate
selling tactic thus unfairly exploiting the purposes for which the rule was
originally created. Legislation has been enacted in an effort to curtail such
abuses. Outside of this abusive area, the ancient rule continues unmodified."7 6
Technological developments have increased the importance of
contracting outside the scope of these federal regulations. The question arises
whether the final conclusion of the Corbin treatise is compelled by existing
authority-whether only by making a complete break with existing common
law authority could a court take the view that assent to proffered terms
accompanying unsolicited intangibles or services is given by much conduct
short of complete failure to deal with services or intangibles. As it turns out,
there is some precedent that might be serviceable to this end.
The normal treatment at common law is the duty to act in good faith
arises after contract formation; it does not appertain to contract formation.77
73 In some cases there may be issues of line-drawing, as to whether the item, even if in
physical form, primarily involves an intangible. See generaljy UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (delivery of promotional compact disks
containing music covered by the act); F.T.C. v. Think All Publ'g, L.L.C., No. 4:07-CV-11,
2007 WL 173854, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2007) (treating software on a compact disk as
covered).
Understanding that the statute proscribes "mailing," exclusion from the statutory
regulation also may arise for arrangements involving services or intangibles not mailed.
74 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3.21 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev.
ed. 1993).
7s Id at 422-24.
76 Id at 424.
77 Eg., Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988). See generaly
Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Cupa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Stud, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401, 401 ("The common law appears to
have no counterpart to the German doctrine of culpa in contrahendo: that contracting
parties are under a duty, classified as contractual, to deal in good faith with each other
during the negotiation stage, or else face liability, customarily to the extent of the wronged
party's reliance.';.
Consumer protection regulations, however, may extend the duty to the bargaining
phase. Eg., Mo. CODE REGs. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-8.040(1) (Westlaw through May 31, 2014)
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Yet, in a variety of circumstances, the rule that silence does not operate as an
assent yields where a party acts opportunistically. Russell V. Raynes Associates
Ltd. Partnersh /78 involves an offer made by an estate to participate in a
cooperative conversion. A combination of a minimum percentage of
residents being required to make the conversion effective, coupled with issues
as to the ability of an estate to participate, evidently created the possibility that
the sponsors might strategically decline to reply promptly to a tendered offer
by the estate. The court holds it is a question of fact as to whether the
sponsor's silent retention of the offer operated as an acceptance:
Certainly, where a party remains silent with the purpose of misleading
the other party, such silence is "inconsistent with honest dealings and
... may be deemed to be an acquiescence." Thus, in this case, if
Sponsors deliberately remained silent in order to retain the agreement
only so long as it was necessary to help in achieving the requisite
15%, their silence would constitute an acceptance.79
In addition, as the Corbin treatise notes,s0 a number of old cases hold
silence of an offeree who engaged a third party to solicit offers may operate as
an acceptance. The court in Hendrickson v. International Harvester Co. ofAmerica,
indicating the rule it adopts is in accord with case law in three other
jurisdictions, states:
And true it is that it is frequently said that one is ordinarily under no
obligation to do or say anything concerning a proposition which he
does not choose to accept; yet we think that, when one sends out an
agent to solicit orders for his goods, authorizing such agent to take
such orders subject to his (the principal's) approval, fair dealing and
the exigencies of modern business require us to hold that he shall
signify to the customer within a reasonable time from the receipt of
("It is an unfair practice for any person in connection with the advertisement or sale of
merchandise to violate the duty of good faith in solicitation, negotiation and performance,
or in any manner fail to act in good faith (see section 400.2-103(1)(b), Restatement,
Second, Contracts section 205).").
78 569 N.Y.S.2d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
79 Id. at 414-15 (quoting Club Chain of Manhattan, Ltd. v. Christopher & Seventh Gourmet,
Ltd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
so CORBIN, supra note 74, § 3.21, at 418.
Virginia Law & Business Review
the order his rejection of it, or suffer the consequence of having his
silence operate as an approval."
So, Hendrickson supports the notion that the context can alter the otherwise
traditional rules governing whether assent has been given in the absence of
verbal communication. Hendrickson and Russell involve determinations where
the context increases the scope of circumstances where assent exists.
Understanding authority indicates the context can change the treatment, it
would seem also to be the case that the context may decrease the extent to
which actions constitute assent. The opportunistic transmission of unordered
intangibles or services, with a view to benefitting from frictions to achieve
favorable terms, would seem at least as compelling a basis for deviating from
the normal treatment as the business exigencies, arising from the order of
farm equipment, alluded-to in Hendrickson.
Weishut v. Lqyton & Lqyton, a case involving a battle offorms as to the timing
of performance, holds a trial court did not err in charging a jury that an
offeree may have had a duty to notify the offeror that the offeree did not
assent to the altered term, so that silence could operate as an assent to a
contract on altered terms. The approved charge was as follows:
Where one party makes a definite offer for the sale of a
commodity before a contract results therefrom there must be an
acceptance of the offer, by the other party, absolute and identical
with the terms of the offer.
Ordinarily silence on the part of the party to whom the offer is
made will not constitute an acceptance, but there may be instances
where under all the facts and circumstances there is a duty imposed
by law on the part of the party receiving the offer, to inform the
person making the offer that the same is not accepted, and when this
legal duty is found to exist, a failure in its performance will result in a
contract equally binding on both parties.
Where there is an agreement and the language of the agreement
is doubtful in meaning, that meaning is to prevail against either party
which he knew or had reason to believe that the other party
understood it.
If you should believe from all the evidence, that under all the
facts and circumstances there was a duty upon the defendant to
81 Hendrickson v. Int'l Harvester Co. of Am., 135 A. 702, 705 (Vt. 1927).
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communicate to the plaintiff the fact that it did not accept the terms
contained in the plaintiffs telegram and letter dated June
seventeenth, and it failed in this duty, then you may find that the
parties to the action did enter into the contract sued upon in this
action.8 2
Moreover, other authority indicates that whether the terms are unusual is
relevant in making these determinations. Hars v. Santee River Cpress Lumber
Co. affirms the findings of a bench trial that retention of an order did not
operate as an acceptance where the order was on unusual terms (a very large
order at a low price)." Thus, we have extant authority supporting both the
notion that ordinary principles governing non-verbal assent to an offer can
yield based on the context and that the nature of the terms can also be
considered in applying the principles governing assent.
C. Tickets and other Tokens Providing Contract Terms
Consider whether words printed on a ticket or stub can constitute
contractual terms. Contemporary courts have a number of common paths for
concluding not. The direct approach would be to apply unconscionability,
though litigants proposing that course are typically unsuccessful.8 4 The direct
approach of unconscionability, policing the bargain based on the way it was
formed, may appear noxious to a long-standing conceptualization of freedom
of contract. It is contemporaneously supplemented by approaches treating
tickets or stubs" as not appearing to memorialize contract terms-
memorably phrased as language that "did not arise to the dignity of a
contract" 6-or as being ineffective by virtue of having been delivered after
the contract has been formed.
82 Weishut v. Layton & Layton, Inc., 93 A. 1057, 1060 (Del. Super. Ct. 1915).
83 Harris v. Santee River Cypress Lumber Co., 72 A. 392, 393 (R.I. 1909).
84 For example, a relatively recent survey finds only a handful of reported cases in a
particular jurisdiction, Missouri, where courts find contractual provisions unconscionable.
Royce de Rohan Barondes, The Contours of the Unconsionability Defense in Missouri (Univ. of
Missouri-Columbia Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 01, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=955960.
85 The court in Tanenbaum Textile Co. v. Schlanger, 40 N.E.2d 225, 226 (N.Y. 1942), references
similar treatment of an invoice: "But that is not this case. An invoice, as such, is no
contract. An invoice is a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity and the cost or
price of the things invoiced."
86 Healy v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 138 N.Y.S. 287, 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
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This form of contracting can reflect a conscious attempt to benefit from
frictions in contract formation to secure contractual terms that might be more
difficult to obtain were there express negotiation. Consider, for example, the
assent to terms of ski tickets, which address an oft-litigated relationship. 7 It
surely takes less time to sell the tickets if the clerk need not recite a liability
release before selling a ticket from a booth.
But increased efficiency in communication of terms is not the only
advantage. It allows the seller (licensor) to avoid providing a venue in which a
customer is prompted to consider the implications of the contemplated
terms. That could be significant. The resort doesn't want to have to get into a
discussion of this kind of matter. Having customers focus on the possible
adverse consequences of the relationship or activity, in general, may have
some effect on sales. But in addition, it may prompt disclosure of adverse
circumstances that otherwise would not be disclosed.
If someone in a booth has to say that the resort will not be liable for
customers' injuries, some customers may then be prompted to ask, in
circumstances where they would not otherwise, whether there have been
injuries at the resort. The resort would need to decide whether to have its
employees refuse to comment, which may be taken by customers as providing
negative information, or to have them address the matter accurately, and
potentially communicate negative information. None of this will increase
sales, but it may decrease them. So, to some extent, giving effect to these
terms surreptitiously obtained may slightly alter the contractual arrangements
that otherwise would be obtained were there express bargaining.
But it would be a mistake to claim old authority rejected direct review of
the reasonableness of terms contemplated by language printed on a ticket.
Over one hundred years ago, a Williston edition of Pollock on Contracts, in
addition to characterizing a ticket as "a mere token or voucher ... not the
contract,"" minimizing the impact of the writing on contract terms, states
enforceability of these kind of terms "is probably subject to an implied
condition that the terms are relevant and reasonable. It cannot be said that
the subject is yet free from doubt." 9
87 See generaly Steven L. Nelson, Cause of Action Against Ski Area Opera/or for Injury or Death
Occuning on Ski Slope or Ski Lift, 5 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 719 (1994), available at Westlaw 5
COA2d 719 (through Dec. 2014).88 FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY: THIRD
AMERICAN FROM THE SEVENTH ENGLISH EDITION 53 n.60 (Gustavus H. Wald & Samuel
Williston eds., 1906).
89 Id at 54-55. The discussion there addresses contracts for carriage or custody of goods. See
also id at 53.
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That authority, by its terms, appears to address only contracts formed by
common carriers or others with a common duty. Nevertheless, it is an
application of principles of contract. As the annotation notes, the law at that
time provided those parties were under implied duties that could not be
eliminated by mere notice. "[I]t requires no contract to create these; it does
require one to divest them."90
A similar approach is taken in Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sa. Bank ofLos
Angeles:
But it is evident that the statement comes in the category of 'traps for
the unwary,' and before such statement can be given effect as a
contract binding upon the depositor and changing in a substantial
particular the relation which presumably he thought he was entering
into, it must appear affirmatively that he consented and agreed to it
either by being required to sign it or by having his attention
particularly called to it. It is not sufficient merely that it appear in the
front of the passbook. The case is not one in which the party must
know that he is accepting a contract, as where he is accepting an
insurance policy, and should therefore realize the necessity of
acquainting himself with its terms.91
We can frame as follows this authority that is summarized in Pollock on
Contracts: The statutory provisions gave rise to a general expectation that
contractual arrangements of a particular type would be governed by a
particular set of rules-in that case, rules provided by statute. So, the
expectation of contracting being on particular terms necessitates a particular
level of prominence to alter those terms.
This treatment comports with the contemporary notion of frictions.
Statutory provisions create an expectation contracting will be on particular
terms, which one can frame as there being increased frictions associated with
formation of assent. Consumers are less likely to be informed by
communication that might be sufficient in other contexts-in other contexts
where there are not standardized expectations. Where greater effort is
required to assure there is actual assent, greater efforts are required in
memorializing the pertinent terms.
90 Id. 53 n.61.
91 Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank of Los Angeles, 182 P. 293, 298 (Cal. 1919).
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CONCLUSION
A few decades ago, some scholars glibly asserted market forces would
operate to eliminate collectively inferior ancillary contract terms. Over time,
there has been some retreat from that bold view. Building on the
development of modeling frictions in markets, this article presents simple
models of frictions in multi-period contracting, incorporating frictions
preventing switching and limited dissemination of information concerning
ancillary contract terms. The modeling illustrates that, for plausible parameter
estimates of frictions, combinations of switching costs and investigation costs
may allow collectively inferior contract terms to persist in consumer
transactions. The results expand on recent evidence illustrating the
infrequency with which consumers actually read contract terms.
The modeling results are likely consistent with one's intuition. The
modeling, then, provides a more formal basis for rejecting the glib assertion
that market forces would eliminate collectively inferior ancillary contract
terms.
Merchants, particularly in consumer contracting, might well be inclined to
engage in opportunistic behavior, framing assent in a fashion that allows these
frictions apparently to secure contract terms superior for them, albeit
collectively suboptimal. The modeling identifies classes of circumstances
where this opportunistic behavior is particularly likely to be successful in
securing beneficial, but collectively suboptimal, terms. They include: (i)
contracts of a small dollar amounts, whether in terms of value of
consideration or marginal cost in performing; (ii) contracting involving the
sequencing of relationship-specific investments during contract formation;
(iii) multi-period contracting, especially where involving increasing switching
costs; (iv) merchants who sell to pools of customers involving new customer
entrants over time, including rapidly growing markets; and (v) circumstances
where one proffering suboptimal terms may bifurcate contractual terms,
providing better terms to informed customers. One can see that a number of
these factors are common to the provision of online services.
A primitive conceptualization of contract doctrine might suggest that
courts, cognizant of these concerns, are nevertheless compelled to give effect
to this opportunistic behavior, until it crosses the threshold of gross
misconduct restrained by fraud or unconscionability. Part V of this article
provides contrary illustrations. In lieu of providing a comprehensive
collection of authority, which would be much too large an undertaking, Part
V provides illustrations of selected authority that can be revived by a court
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inclined to police opportunistic structuring of the methods of mutual assent
to secure collectively suboptimal contract terms. Focusing merely on
common law authority addressing incorporation by reference, silence as
acceptance and the use of tickets and other tokens to provide contract terms,
Part V illustrates the wealth of authority that a court may reference in seeking
to return sufficient nuance to contract doctrine to restrain this kind of
opportunism.
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APPENDIX I
Fig. 2. Flow Chart Illustrating Steps Modeled in Pan II
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APPENDIX II
Let us define:
Mbo the number of market participants with Bad
(inferior) terms at the beginning of Time Period 0
Mb0No S witch the number of market participants with inferior
terms at the beginning of Time Period 0 who cannot
switch
the market growth rate per period (expressed as a
fraction/decimal)
L the attrition rate from Bad to Good, of those who
can switch
4 the fraction of incumbents who can switch from Bad
to Good at the beginning of the current period who
become unable to switch in the current period (no
switch fraction)
Those who become unable to switch during Time Period 0 equals:
MbO - MbONoSwitch ] W. Thus, the clients who switch is represented by:
a { Mbo - Mb0No S wit ch + Mbo 'p - Mb0No S witch ], or
[a ( 1 - wp) (Mbo - MboN o Switch)]
This yields a new inflow rate, stated as a fraction of those having inferior
ancillary terms as of the beginning of Time Period 0, to merchants having
Bad terms of:
inflow rate = 77 + a (1 - V)) (i MboNoSwitch W
The term inflow rate represents a fraction that, when multiplied by the number
of clients having Bad terms at the beginning of the period, is the number new
market entrants in that period that must be captured by those offering Bad
terms to maintain a steady state. For example, a required inflow rate of 0.15
means that, in the period, new market entrants having Bad terms must equal
15% of the number of market participants having Bad terms at the beginning
of the period.
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During Time Period 1, the number of clients who cannot switch equals:
(i) the number who cannot switch at the end of Time Period 0 plus
(ii) Q (the no-switch rate) multiplied by the number of market
participants at the end of Time Period 0 having Bad terms who can
switch
We have from above that (i) equals:
Mb0No S witch + [ Mbo - Mb0No Swi t ch ] j, or
[MbO j + Mb0NoSwitch (i -
Understanding that the market size of those having Bad terms at the end
of Time Period 0 is Mbo (1 + q), we have that (ii) equals:
uj { Mbo 1 - EMbO 4 + Mb0No Switch (i - ,
yielding the number having Bad terms who cannot switch during Time Period
1 equals:
[MbO j + Mb0NoS witch (i - + MO (i+ri) - EMbO + Mb0NoS witch (i -
This can be simplified to:
[MbONoSwitch (i - w)2] + Mbo 14 (2 - 4 + r)
That means those who switch equals:
a I MbO (1+r) - [MbNoSwitch (i - w)2] + Mbo uj (2- ip + q) ] }
which simplifies to:
a (1 - i) { MbO 1 +q) - i] - [MbONoSwitch (i - )]
Understanding the inflow has to equal plus the attrition, that equates to an
inflow rate (as a fraction of the period-beginning number of market
participants having inferior terms) of:
inflow rate = i + a (1 - 4 [i - MbONoSwitch Mbo V MboNoSwitch V] (2)Mbo Mbo (1+ )
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When:
[Mbo MboNOSwitch(n + ) ] = 0,
the model reaches a steady state, such that the rate of inflow is constant (the
rate of inflow in Time Period 0 is the same as in Time Period 1 (Equations (1)
and (2)). We can restate this criterion as:
MbONoSwitch = (3)
Mbo 7
Substituting the fraction of customers who cannot switch, as of the
beginning of the period, in steady-state, from Equation (3), into the formula
for the inflow rate of new clients into those having Bad terms from Equation
(1), we get the following steady-state inflow rate when there are switching
costs:
Rearranging yields:
steady state inflow rate (fraction of Bad) = 7 1 + a (4)
which can be restated as:
steady state inflow rate (fraction of Bad) = 77 1 + a (5)
77 i~4
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